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This paper examines determinants of corruption across Russian regions. Key contributions 
include: (i) a formal study of economic corruption determinants across Russian regions; (ii) 
comparisons of determinants of perceived corruption versus those of actual corruption; and 
(iii) studying the influence of market competition and other factors on corruption. The re-
sults show that economic prosperity, population, market competition and urbanization are 
significant determinants of Russian corruption. The use of alternative corruption measures 
reveals that economic prosperity and population have a largely similar impact on corrup-
tion perceptions and corruption incidence. However, there are significant differences in the 
effects of competition and urbanization. 
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan korruptiota Venäjän aluetasolla. Tulokset osoittavat, että ta-
loudellinen hyvinvointi, väkiluku, markkinakilpailu sekä kaupungistuminen ovat aluetason 
korruption merkittäviä selittäjiä Venäjällä. Taloudellisella hyvinvoinnilla ja väkiluvulla on 
samansuuntainen vaikutus sekä havaittuun korruptioon (corrpution perceptions) että kor-
ruption  esiintymiseen  (corruption  incidence).  Sen  sijaan  kilpailutilanteen  ja  kaupungis-
tumisasteen vaikutukset näihin kahteen korruptiomittariin ovat erilaiset.  
 
Asiasanat: havaittu korruptio (corrpution perceptions), korruption esiintyminen (corruption 
incidence), Venäjä, hallitus, kilpailu 
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1  Introduction and motivation 
 
This research uses regional data to formally examine the economic causes of corruption 
across regions of the Russian Federation. Besides providing unique insights into factors 
determining corruption, this paper contributes to the broader literature on country-specific 
corruption studies and provides useful policy inputs. While there are numerous studies ex-
amining various aspects of cross-national corruption, related investigations analysing de-
tails of corruption in individual countries are few, due primarily to a lack of adequate data 
on the extent of corrupt activity across regions. In addition, we evaluate causes of both cor-
ruption perception and actual corruption incidence, which is still relatively rare in the lit-
erature. 
In international comparisons of corruption perceptions, Russia usually fares rela-
tively badly. For example, in 2010, Transparency International, the corruption watchdog 
organization, ranked Russia 154th out of 178 countries in terms of corruption perceptions 
(Transparency International, 2010). While one can debate whether Russia is really more 
corrupt than, say, Haiti, it is clear that corruption is a serious problem in Russia, ranging 
from petty corruption to high-level corruption involving e.g. legislators and senior civil 
servants. This makes studying causes and covariates of corruption all the more important 
for Russia. It is likely that corruption significantly influences economic decisions by both 
households and companies. For example, a majority of Russians seem to treat law en-
forcement officials with apprehension, which has an obvious effect on willingness to obey 
laws and on contract enforcement.
1 
Russia is a large, geographically and ethnically diverse country. Hence, it is natu-
ral to assume that corruption also varies between regions. Since 2008, the Russian Federa-
tion has consisted of 83 federal subjects, while before 2008 there were 89 regions. Ther e 
are all-in-all six different categories of federal subject,
2, including two federal cities: Mos-
cow and St Petersburg. Regions differ in geographical size, population, degree of urbaniza-
tion and economic structure. We are thus well positioned to assess wh at kinds of factors 
are associated with corruption in Russian regions. 
                                                 
1 Troika Dialog (2011) reports a Levada Center opinion poll in which 67% of respondents treat law enforce-
ment officials ‘probably‘ or ‘definitely’ with apprehension. Only 5% ‘definitely’ trust them. 
2 Russia has 21 republics, 9 krais (‘territories’), 46 oblasts (‘provinces’), one autonomous oblast (‘The Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast’ in the Russian Far East), 4 autonomous okrugs (‘autonomous districts’) and two federal 
cities. For the purpose of this study, the administrative differences between region types do not matter. Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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Country-specific corruption studies are generally hampered by the availability of 
adequate data, and Russia is no exception. While a handful of papers examine corruption in 
Russia from various points of view (for more details see Guriev, 2007), there is  a paucity 
of papers examining the regional variation in corruption in Russia.  Regarding the small 
amount of literature formally studying the determinants of Russian corruption, Dininio and 
Orttung (2005) and Sharafutdinova (2010) use different aspects of similar corruption data 
to us to test primarily political causes of corruption. They consistently find that  a higher 
per capita income level decreases corruption. In addition, Dininio and Orttung (2005) ar-
gue that the effect of the size of the bureaucracy is sensitive to whether population effects 
are accounted for or not. Since the largest number of Russian bureaucrats can be found in 
Moscow, followed by St Petersburg, this indicates that the two metropolises are likely to 
lie behind this sensitivity. No other (mainly political) variable is statistically significant in 
explaining the amount of corruption. 
In another study, Demidov (2005) looks into the effectiveness of the President’s 
special envoys to federal okrugs
3 in tackling corruption. In principle, special envoys could 
be effective e.g. in tackling corruption among the governors of different regions. However, 
Demidov’s view is that they certainly had no positive influence on corruption, and, in some 
cases, the envoys and their staff seem to have increased the level of corruption. Further, 
Mokhtari and Grafova (2007) develop a model where tax inspectors are potential bribe-
takers, and therefore an increase in the number of inspectors can actually decrease tax 
revenue, ceteris paribus. In their empirical study, too, they find that the number of tax in-
spectors is negatively related to per capita tax collection. The authors conclude that bribe-
taking in the tax administration explains the result. Our contribution is quite different from 
Mokhtari and Grafova (2007). While their theoretical model was concerned with bribe-
taking, their empirical model did not include any variables directly dealing with corruption. 
Instead they relied on indirect inference regarding the level of corruption in Russia’s tax 
administration. 
In actual fact, these studies do not formally examine the distinction between per-
ceived and actual corruption. We, in contrast, are able to look directly at the correlation of 
corruption incidence and perceptions with respect to a variety of economic and social vari-
ables. We find that higher income levels tend to decrease both the perception of corruption 
                                                 
3 To ease administration of the Federation, President Putin divided the country initially into seven federal 
okrugs. Later, an eighth okrug was added. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 31/ 2011 
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and its incidence. This result holds for several different measures of income. In this respect 
our results mirror those obtained in cross -country studies (Serra, 2006), among others. 
Higher population seems to increase both corruption incidence and perception, a lthough 
the effect is non-linear. It is interesting that variables relating to the scope of government 
activities at the regional level do not have statistically significant effects on corruption. 
Another noteworthy finding is that in Moscow and  St Petersburg, the two main seats of 
political and economic power in Russia, the perception of corruption is lower, while the 
actual incidence of corruption is higher than elsewhere. It may be that wealthier people in 
the two largest cities do not perceive corruption as one of their key problems, while e.g. 
businesses are required to pay more bribes in these two cities than elsewhere. Urbanization 
reduces corruption perceptions, but not incidence. People in larger cities may find it harder 
to track the actions of other citizens as well as civil servants. Finally, the effects of compe-
tition in the marketplace are different on perceived versus actual corruption. Having more 
companies per capita increases corruption perception, perhaps because people perceive 
companies to be competing for favours vis-à-vis the public sector. However, this  effect 
does not show up in the data on the incidence of actual corruption. 
 
 
2  Model, estimation and data 
 
2.1  Theoretical background 
 
The theory relating to the causes of corruption is tied to the broader literature on the causes 
of criminal activity, where bribe-takers and bribe-givers weigh the relative costs and bene-
fits of their actions (Becker, 1968). For instance, increases in general economic prosperity 
raise the potential costs of illegal acts via strengthened enforcement and by raising the 
costs of apprehension and punishment for perpetrators. Building on this general theme, 
other  scholars,  notably  Rose-Ackerman  (1999)  and  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1993),  have 
framed theories specific to corrupt activity. In this context, the role of the government, in-
cluding its ability to generate red tape and disburse favours out of turn, is a crucial deter-
minant  of  corrupt  activity  (Guriev,  2004).  Government  agencies  often  hold  monopoly 
powers on disbursement of contracts, which presents unique opportunities for rent-seeking. 
Competition among favour-seekers (including the public as well as large and small busi-Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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nesses), on the other hand, induces some with resources to offer higher bribes.  Further, 
even when some government enterprises are privatized (as has been the case especially in 
transition  economies, including Russia),  this creates additional avenues for    generating 
rent(Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Varese, 1997). Finally, anti-corruption initiatives 
are likely to be tied to the economic status of regions (Boerner an d Hainz, 2009). In the 
empirical model below, we take account of the role of the government in terms of its pos-
sible impact on corruption. 
Empirical studies of corruption have mainly used cross-national indices of corrup-
tion, in recent years examining numerous determinants to such an extent that this line of 
inquiry seems to have reached saturation point (see Aidt (2003), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff 
(2006), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008), Serra (2006) for reviews of the extant literature).   
Country-specific studies are quite limited, primarily due to a paucity of acceptable corrup-
tion data (exceptions include Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Goel and Nelson (2011) for the 
United States, and Dong and Torgler (2010) for China). The present research adds to the 
literature by examining causes of corruption across Russian regions. There have only been 
a few formal studies of corruption in Russia,
4 although the country has some unique attrib-
utes that could crucially impact the level of corrupt activity, notably its sheer siz e and the 
transition to a market economy.
5 
 
2.2  Estimation model 
 
Following the above discussion, and based on the overall literature on the causes of corrup-
tion (see Aidt  (2003), Jain (2001),  Lambsdorff (2006), Serra (2006), Svensson (2005), 
Treisman  (2000)),  our  general  estimated  equation  to  explain  the  causes  of  corruption 
across Russian regions takes the following general form (with subscript i denoting a Rus-
sian region): 
                                                 
4 See introduction in section 1 above for some exceptions. 
5 See Levin and Satarov (2000) for an illuminating general discussion.  See also Cheloukhine and King 
(2007), Osipian (2010) and Safavian et al. (2001). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 31/ 2011 
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Corruptionij = f (Economic statureik, Government roleim, Populationi, Competitioni, Pri-
vatizationi, Urbanin, Unemploymenti)  (1) 
i = 1,…,40 
j = CORRperc, CORRamt 
k = GRPpc, INCpc 
m = GOVTemp, GOVTtran 
n = Urbanization, DUMmspt 
 
The  dependent  variable  is  alternately  measured  as  an  index  of  corruption  perceptions 
(CORRperc) and as an index of corruption incidence (CORRamt). Both indices range from 
zero to one, with one denoting the highest level of corruption.
6 While appropriate caution 
should be used in interpreting the indices, the mean on CORRperc in the sample is greater 
than that on CORRamt → 0.59 versus 0.44. Further, the correlation between the two cor-
ruption measures is a modest 0.31 (see Table 3). A list of regions included in the sample is 
provided in the Appendix. 
This alternative treatment of the dependent variable provides a useful robustness 
check, especially given some criticisms in the literature regarding the shortcomings of cor-
ruption perception indices (Olken, 2009; Sampford et al., 2006). Further, the determinants 
of corruption have been shown to be somewhat sensitive to the measure of corruption em-
ployed. For example, see Goel and Nelson (2011) for evidence related to the United States 
and Treisman (2007) for cross-national evidence.
7 
In line with the literature that takes economic prosperity to be a strong determ i-
nant of corruption (see Gundlach and Paldam (2009), Serra (2006); also Bardhan (1997) 
for a broader discussion), the economic status of a region is included by using two different 
measures: (i) gross regional product per capita (GRPpc); and (ii) regional income per cap-
ita (INCpc). The use of different prosperity measures should provide a useful test of the 
validity of the findings. In our sample, the correlation between GRPpc and INCpc is 0.84 
(Table 3). The overall idea is that improvement in economic well-being reduces corruption, 
either by increasing governmental resources devoted to anti-corruption efforts or by in-
                                                 
6 In the formal estimation, we take the natural logarithms of both CORRperc and CORRamt to unbind them. 
This transformation, however, results in the loss of one observation, as a natural logarithm is undefined at 
zero. 
7 Even in this broader literature, however, there  is no evidence of consistent and comparable cross -national 
indices of either corruption perceptions or corruption incidence. Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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creasing  the  opportunity  costs  for  illegal  acts  by  both  bribe-takers  and  bribe-givers 
(Boerner and Hainz (2009)). 
The role of government is crucial in both generating and combating rent-seeking 
activities (see Rose-Ackerman (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for general discussion, 
and Levin and Satarov (2000) for related discussion specific to Russia). Government em-
ployment (GOVTemp) can proxy for the size of bureaucracy,
8 although some public em-
ployees may be involved in fighting corruption (e.g., judicial and police employment). Fur-
ther, governments routinely make transfer payments (grants), which provides opportunities 
for rent-seeking for officials in charge of disbursements. We account for this aspect by in-
cluding transfers from the federal government to regional governments (GOVTtran). 
Population (POP) is included to account for the physical size of regions and to 
capture the competition for favours (see Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) for a similar consideration in the case of the United States). Other things being the 
same, greater population would increase corrupt activity, although there might be some 
nonlinearities in the relation between corruption and population. While population captures 
general competition for favours, we include the number of enterprises per capita (Compete) 
as a measure of market competition and to capture competition for  favours from busi-
nesses. The comparison of relative effects of general favours sought by the population ver-
sus those by businesses is a novel angle studied in the literature. Privatization creates op-
portunities for rent-generation through the sale of favours, although it is possible that, over 
time,  corruption  might  even be  greater in  the  absence of privatization (Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum, 1997). The link between privatization in transition economies and the level of 
corrupt activity has been recognized by several scholars (see Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 
(1997) and Varese (1997) for examples). It would be interesting to study whether privatiza-
tion matters in terms of its impact on corruption after the heavy phase of privatization in 
the initial transition years ended. We use the number of public enterprises privatized per 
capita (Privatize) in each region to capture the influence on corruption perceptions and in-
cidence. Besides the comparative effects on perceptions versus incidence, the use of hard 
privatization data (as opposed to indices of privatization) can be seen as a contribution to 
the broader corruption literature. 
                                                 
8 Doninio and Orttung (2005) alternatively measure the size of bureaucracy by the (non-normalized) number 
of bureaucrats. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 31/ 2011 
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Competition  for  favours  and  risk  of  exposure  for  corrupt  acts  might  also  be 
greater in urban areas. The degree of urbanization (URBAN) is accordingly included in the 
estimations (see Glaeser and Saks (2006)). 
Further, two Russian regions, Moscow and St Petersburg, are large urban areas, as 
well as the main seats of political and economic power. Other things being the same, there 
is likely to be greater competition for favours and greater government disbursements in 
these regions. To take this into consideration, we include a dummy variable, DUMmspt, 
that takes the value one if the region is Moscow or St Petersburg and zero elsewhere.  Fi-
nally, the impatience of bribe-givers to offer bribes might be greater in periods of high un-
employment (UN), as there are more unemployed vying for jobs and some might be will-
ing to offer bribes to secure government jobs and contracts. 
 
2.3    Data 
 
The data on corruption are from the Russian arm of Transparency International. While 
these data come from a reputable organization and provide a consistent measure of corrupt 
activity, they are not without some shortcomings – the main ones being availability for one 
year only (2002) and the limitation to only forty regions (out of a total of 89, although the 
most important ones are included – see Appendix for a list of included regions). However, 
the data are quite representative of geographical, industrial and ethnic diversity across Rus-
sia.  For more detailed information  concerning the data, see Transparency  International 
(2002). In the absence of a better measure of corruption, and to provide formal insights 
into causes of corruption in Russia using this unique insight, we limit the study to 2002 and 
to forty regions. One virtue of using the 2002 data is that this period is unlikely to be pick-
ing up disproportionately high corruption associated with nascent institutions and large-
scale privatization in the initial transition years (see Andvig (2006), Levin and Satarov 
(2000), Osipian (2010)). 
We utilize both corruption perception and incidence data, as this is more likely to 
give a more nuanced picture of the situation. The underlying data is collected from surveys 
of both individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises. Corruption perception means 
correspondents’ general perception of corruption (everyday, related to different levels of 
administration etc.) in their region. The corruption incidence index is based on data from Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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questions relating to the frequency and amounts of bribe-giving the respondents them-
selves had been associated with. 
The data for the other variables come mostly from the Russian Federal Statistical 
Service  (www.gks.ru).  Details  about  the  variables  used,  sum mary  statistics  and  data 
sources are provided in Table 1, while Table 3 provides pair-wise correlations. 
 
 
3  Results 
 
All cross-sectional estimations were conducted using the STATA software package, with 
OLS used as the estimation technique.
9 The estimation results are reported in Table 2. Pan-
els A and B, respectively, in Table 2 report results with alternative measures of corruption 
as the dependent variable – corruption perceptions (CORRperc) and corruption incidence 
(CORRamt). The different models in Table 2 have a reasonable fit, especially given the 
relatively small size of the sample. 
As a general test of specification, we performed a RESET test. This generally 
showed an absence of significant specification error in all cases – i.e. the resulting chi-
squared statistic was statistically insignificant at the five per cent level in all instances. The 
following aspects are noteworthy across determinants of corruption perceptions and inci-
dence, respectively. 
 
3.1  Determinants of corruption perceptions 
 
  Greater economic prosperity reduces corruption perceptions. This finding is 
robust across the two measures: GRPpc and INCpc.
10 It is likely the case that 
more prosperous regions have greater anti-corruption measures and relatively 
prosperous individuals are dissuaded from engaging in illegal corrupt activi-
ties.
11 
                                                 
9 The relatively modest sample size and its cross-sectional dimension place some limitations on the scope of 
the analysis and the nature of the estimation methodology employed. 
10 Potential reverse causality from corruption to prosperity is somewhat mitigated by the cross-sectional na-
ture of the analysis. Recent research has, in any case, shown that the main direction of causality runs from 
prosperity to corruption (Gundlach and Paldam, 2009). 
11 See Gundlach and Paldam (2009) for support for this finding in a cross -national context, and Sharafutdi-
nova (2010) for Russia. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 31/ 2011 
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  The role of government, measured alternately by government employment 
(GOVTemp) or via government transfers (GOVTtrans), does not appreciably 
affect corruption perceptions.
12 
  Greater population density (POP), signifying competition for favours among 
bribe-givers, increases corruption perceptions, albeit the relation appears to be 
nonlinear. Nonlinearities between corruption and its determinants are largely 
ignored in related studies (Serra (2006)). 
  Greater competition between firms (Compete), on the other hand, strongly 
contributes to corruption perceptions in all instances. Bribe-giving by firms 
can be perceived to be widespread, both among the general population and 
vis-à-vis other companies. 
  Greater privatization does not affect corruption perceptions. The resulting co-
efficient is statistically insignificant. It is likely the case that after the initial 
phase of privatization, further privatization was more sporadic. 
  The unemployment rate (UN) does not show appreciable impacts on the level 
of corrupt activity (see Sharafutdinova (2010) for similar findings). 
  Greater urbanization (URBAN) lowers corruption perceptions. The intuition 
behind this finding is that greater urbanization is acting as a deterrent, with 
both bribe-takers and bribe-givers being somewhat dissuaded by the relatively 
greater risk of exposure in urban areas. There is also generally greater media 
attention on corrupt activities in urban areas. 
  Consideration of another dimension of urbanization by separately focusing on 
the largest metropolitan areas produces different findings. The dummy vari-
able identifying the two large metropolitan areas of Moscow and St Peters-
burg (DUMmspt) is negative and significant in all instances. Controlling for 
various factors, corruption perceptions were lower in the largest urban re-
gions. Interestingly, this also holds when the degree of urbanization is con-
trolled for (Model 5A). 
We turn next to examining the determinants of actual corruption. 
 
                                                 
12 It is possible, however, that inclusion of governmental data at a finer level of detail could provide greater Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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3.2  Determinants of corruption incidence 
 
  As before, greater GRPpc and INCpc lower corruption incidence. The find-
ings with regard to the negative effect of GPRpc on corruption incidence sup-
port earlier literature on Russian corruption (Dininio and Orttung (2005)) as 
well as the broader literature on corruption determinants (see Gundlach and 
Paldam (2009); and Lambsdorff (2006) and Serra (2006) for literature re-
views). The significance of different economic prosperity measures in reduc-
ing corruption perceptions as well as corruption incidence is noteworthy, es-
pecially given the modest correlation between the two corruption measures 
(Tables 3 and 4). 
  The effects of the two government variables (GOVTemp and GOVTtran), and 
of those of urbanization and unemployment, are statistically insignificant on 
corruption incidence as well as corruption perceptions. 
  Regional population (POP) again shows nonlinearities in terms of its effects 
on corruption, although the quadratic term is now significant in one of the 
two cases (Model 6B with INCpc denoting economic prosperity). 
  A more striking contrast across corruption causes emerges with regard to 
Compete. Greater market competition does not significantly affect corruption 
incidence. Thus, while competing firms are perceived to seek favours via 
bribery, these efforts are not registering in terms of increases in actual corrup-
tion. 
  Privatization, like its effect on corruption perceptions, fails to show up as sig-
nificant in corruption incidence. From a political perspective, additional pri-
vatization in the decade following the breakup of the Soviet Union seems 
relatively insignificant, at least from a corruption viewpoint. 
  Corruption incidence is found to be greater in the Moscow and St Petersburg 
regions, ceteris paribus, especially in the models where population effects are 
directly accounted for (Models 1B and 2B). This result is consistent with the 
notion that there is greater disbursement of favours in large government seats, 
trade centres and major ports (see Goel and Nelson (2011)). Again, it is note-
                                                                                                                                                    
insights, as has been seen in regards to other countries. See, for example, Fisman and Gatti (2002). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 31/ 2011 
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worthy that in the two largest cities, corruption perception is lower than inci-
dence. 
Besides the differences across the determinants of perceived and actual corruption noted 
above, several other points seem significant. Firstly, in terms of magnitude, i ncreases in 
economic prosperity have a greater (negative) effect on corruption incidence than on cor-
ruption perceptions. This is true for both measures of prosperity employed and is consistent 
with intuition. Secondly, the effects of government employment are  insignificant. (Find-
ings for corruption across US states in this regard are mixed, see e.g. Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) and Goel and Nelson (2011).) Thirdly, the effects for urbanization are found to be 
negative on corruption perceptions, but not on incidence for Russia. (The evidence for the 
US is mixed in this regard. Some have found the effects of urbanization to be significant 
(Goel and Nelson, 2011), while others have not (Glaeser and Saks, 2006).) Fourthly, em-
ploying ‘hard’ data on the number of enterprises privatized, we find that privatization has 
no impact on actual or perceived corruption. Fifthly, there is a marked difference in the 
impact of the two largest metropolitan regions in terms of their impacts on perceptions and 
incidence. The two main seats of power have higher incidence of corruption, while corrup-
tion perceptions are lower. Finally, greater market competition between firms increased 
corruption perceptions but not incidence. 
 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on country-specific studies of corruption by examin-
ing economic causes of corruption across Russian regions. Specific contributions include: 
(i) formal study of corruption causes across Russian regions; (ii) comparisons of determi-
nants of perceived corruption and those of actual corruption; and (iii) examining the influ-
ence of the size of the enterprise sector on corruption. 
Our results show that economic prosperity, population, urbanization, market com-
petition as well as large metropolitan regions are significant determinants of Russian cor-
ruption, with often significant variations in explaining perceived versus actual corruption. 
The negative effect of economic prosperity supports the larger corruption determinants lit-
erature (see Gundlach and Paldam, 2009; Serra, 2006), and the effect on corruption inci-Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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dence supports earlier findings for Russia (Dininio and Orttung, 2005). In terms of magni-
tude, increases in economic prosperity (negatively) impact corruption incidence more than 
they do corruption perceptions. On the other hand, the effects of government employment 
and transfers as well as unemployment are statistically insignificant. Related findings for 
these factors from other countries are mixed (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Glaeser and Saks, 
2006; Goel and Nelson, 2011). Greater market competition increases corruption percep-
tions, but not incidence. This finding can be seen as tying into the cross-national literature 
that has found greater economic freedom lower s  corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2005). 
However, unlike the cross-national literature, our measure of economic freedom is based 
on hard data (i.e. number of enterprises) and we find that competition in fact adds to Rus-
sian corruption perceptions. 
The use of alternative measures of corruption provides some interesting insights. 
While economic prosperity and population have a similar impact on both corruption pe r-
ceptions and corruption incidence, there is a stark difference with regard to the main met-
ropolitan areas of Moscow and St Petersburg, and with respect to number of enterprises. 
Unlike corruption perceptions (which are consistently lower across all models), the inc i-
dence of corruption is shown to be greater in the two main metropolitan areas and the r e-
sulting effect is significant in two instances. Further, it seems that a vibrant economy and 
economic freedoms, as measured by the number of per capita enterprises, lead to higher 
corruption perceptions, i.e. people feel something illegal must be taking place as the num-
ber of enterprises grows. However, the actual incidence of corruption does not increase.  
From a policy perspective, we can make a few recommendations for corruption 
control across Russian regions. Firstly, as regions attain greater economic prosperity, the 
level of corrupt activity (both perceived and actual) will tend to decline. Hence policies 
supporting economic development are recommended for corruption control as well. Sec-
ondly, policies to combat corruption in large areas, denoted by large population, might 
need to be different. Thirdly, while policymakers strive to get a better handle on how cor-
ruption is measured (see Olken (2009), Sampford et al. (2006) for related discussion), they 
should be careful to distinguish between perceived and actual corruption, as evidenced by 
our results for the number of enterprises. Perceptions about corruption might be quite dif-
ferent from reality also with regard to the two main metropolitan areas. However, the size 
of the public sector does not seem to appreciably contribute to corruption. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Tables 
 
Table 1  Variable definitions, summary statistics and data sources 
 
Variable  Definition 
(mean; standard deviation) 
Source 
CORRperc  Index of corruption perceptions, higher values 
greater corruption, range: 0–1; 2002, (0.587; 0.208) 
Center Transparency International 
– Russia (transparency.org.ru) 
CORRamt  Amount of corruption, higher values greater  
corruption, range 0–1; 2002, (0.443; 0.297) 
Center Transparency International 
– Russia (transparency.org.ru) 
GRPpc  Gross revenue product per capita, 2002, current 
prices, roubles, (56,417.860; 42,610.290) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
INCpc  Per capita household income, 2002, current prices, 
roubles, (3,541.750; 1,809.694) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
POP  Regional population, 2002, thousand persons, 
(2,671.783; 1,852.006) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
Compete  Regional enterprises per 1000 inhabitants, 2002, 
(23.613; 12.770) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
GOVTemp  Regional government employment, 2002, % of  
average annual employment in economy, (1.952; 
0.415) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
GOVTtran  Transfers from the federal government per capita, 
2002, current prices, thousand roubles, (1.819; 
1.607) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
Privatize  State enterprises privatized per 1000 inhabitants, 
2002, (0.021; 0.021) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
URBAN  Regional urbanization rate, 2002, %, 
(72.935; 10.669) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
UN  Regional unemployment rate, 2002, %,  
(1.868; 0.873) 
Federal State Statistics Service of 
Russian Federation (www.gks.ru) 
DUMmspt  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the  
region is Moscow or St Petersburg 
 
 
Note: All observations are for the year 2002 or the closest year available and are for the 40 Russian regions for which 
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Table 2  Causes of Corruption Across Russian Regions  
   
Panel A  Determinants of corruption perceptions  
  Dependent Variable = Log(CORRperc) 
 
  1A  2A  3A  4A  5A 
GRPpc  -3.84e-06** 






INCpc    -0.0001** 
(3.9)       
POP  4.14e-06 
(0.1) 
-0.00006 
(0.9)       
POP
2  9.87e-09* 
(1.8) 
2.29e-08** 
(3.9)       






GOVTemp      -0.17 
(1.2) 
-0.20 
(1.1)   
GOVTtran      0.06 
(1.2) 
0.05 
(0.8)   
Privatize        -0.26 
(0.1)   
URBAN          -0.01* 
(2.0) 
UN          -0.07 
(1.0) 























N  39  39  39  34  39 Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
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Panel B  Determinants of corruption incidence 
  Dependent Variable = Log(CORRamt) 
 
 
1B  2B  3B  4B  5B 
GRPpc  -0.00001** 






INCpc    -0.0004** 
(5.2)       
POP  0.0002 
(1.2) 
0.00004 
(0.2)       
POP
2  3.11e-09 
(0.2) 
3.65e-08** 
(2.8)       






GOVTemp      0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.1)   
GOVTtran      -0.06 
(0.5) 
-0.07 
(0.5)   
Privatize        -9.51 
(0.8)   
URBAN          -0.002 
(0.1) 
UN          -0.04 
(0.3) 
























N  39  39  39  34  39 
 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. Constant included but not reported. Absolute t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors. * and ** respectively denote denotes statistical significance at the 10% level and  at  
the 5% level. 
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Table 3   Correlation matrix 
 
   CORRperc  CORRamt  GRPpc  INCpc  POP  Compete  GOVTemp  GOVTtran  Privatize  URBAN  UN 
CORRperc  1.00                               
CORRamt  0.31  1.00                            
GRPpc  -0.30  -0.16  1.00                         
INCpc  -0.21  0.10  0.84  1.00                      
POP  0.18  0.52  0.39  0.68  1.00                   
Compete  0.01  0.28  0.43  0.76  0.73  1.00                
GOVTemp  -0.04  -0.34  -0.24  -0.45  -0.74  -0.57  1.00             
GOVTtran  0.00  -0.27  -0.41  -0.69  -0.70  -0.73  0.70  1.00          
Privatize  -0.13  -0.30  -0.11  -0.16  -0.23  -0.23  0.23  0.18  1.00       
URBAN  -0.29  0.24  0.37  0.58  0.46  0.60  -0.57  -0.57  0.05  1.00    
UN  -0.19  -0.18  -0.04  -0.11  -0.46  -0.34  0.50  0.51  -0.08  -0.14  1.00 
 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions. N =30. 
 Veronika Belousova; Rajeev K. Goel and Iikka Korhonen 
 




  26 
Appendix  List of regions in the sample 
 
Altai Krai  Primorski Krai 
Amur Oblast  Pskov Oblast 
Arkhangelsk Oblast  Rostov Oblast 
Bashkortostan  Ryazan Oblast 
Belgorod Oblast  Samara Oblast 
Chelyabinsk Oblast  Saratov Oblast 
Karelia  St.Petersburg 
Kemerovo Oblast  Stavropol Krai 
Khabarovsk Krai  Sverdlovsk Oblast 
Krasnodar Krai  Tambov Oblast 
Krasnoyarsk Krai  Tatarstan 
Kurgansk Oblast  Tomsk Oblast 
Leningrad Oblast  Tula Oblast 
Moscow  Tumen Oblast 
Moscow Oblast  Tver Oblast 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast  Udmurtia 
Novgorod Oblast  Ulyanovsk Oblast 
Novosibirsk Oblast  Volgograd Oblast 
Omsk Oblast  Voronezh Oblast 
Perm Oblast  Yaroslavl Oblast 
 
Note: For details see Transparency International, Regional Corruption Indices 2002, 
http://transparency.org.ru/proj_index.asp, Transparency International, Moscow, 2002. 
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